信号与企业年金基金管理机构牌照竞争

Signal and Competition for Licenses of Occupational Pension Fund Management Institutions

摘要:

建立了企业年金基金管理机构和监管当局的信号博弈模型，规范研究表明牌照竞争中，高能力机构信号成本应超过低能力机构所能接受的最高成本，才能避免低能力机构的策略性信号干扰，实现市场完全成功的分离均衡。同时，信号成本还受到整个市场机构类型分布的影响，高能力机构越多，信号成本越低。实证研究以内容分析法获得信号成本数据，结果表明一定条件下信号成本越高，企业年金基金管理机构获得牌照的机率越高。

Abstract:

A signaling game, where the occupational pension fund management institutions are senders and compete for licenses while the regulation authority is receiver, is set up. Normative analysis shows that the separating equilibrium of market success, where high-ability institutions signal the competence with a cost higher than that low-ability institutions can support in order to prevent them from strategic signal inference of low-ability institutions, exists. And the more the high-ability institutions are, the lower the signaling cost is. With signaling cost data from content analysis empirical study shows the higher probability of winning the licenses is accompanied by higher signaling cost