库存积压风险对回购激励的影响及其对策

Influence and Countermeasure of Overstock Risk on Buyback Contract

摘要:

针对决策过程中决策者在考察期望收益的同时通常也会考虑获得该期望收益的不确定性这一实际情况,基于“效用”的角度考虑了供应链回购激励机制的目标函数,提出用库存积压风险规避因子来描述决策者的风险偏好,建立了相应的基于Stackelberg主从博弈的回购激励模型,并通过对比风险中性情形的决策过程得出了关于零售商库存积压风险规避态度影响的定量结论：对于库存积压风险规避的零售商,供应商将需要给出更大的激励力度,即零售商将得到风险溢金.设计了基于批发价的目标回购激励机制作为应对策略,并证明了其有效性.

Abstract:

In view of the fact that the decision makers in deciding process tend to consider the uncertainty of yielding their expected profits in addition to an investigation of the expected profits,the objective function in buyback contract is taken into account for the purpose of “utility”,an overstockriskaverse factor is proposed to describe the decision activity of a riskaverse retailer,and then a buyback incentive model is constructed correspondingly on the basis of Stackelberg Game.By comparing with the buyback model containing a riskneutral retailer,some quantificational conclusions about the effect of decisionmakers’ overstockriskaverse tendency are drawn:as for an overstockriskaverse retailer,the supplier should adopt an incentive strategy,which means the retailer may get a premium.A targetbuyback incentive strategy on the basis of wholesale price is designed to give a countermeasure to eliminate the effect of the retailer’s overstockriskaverse preference,whose effectiveness is also proved.