基于多任务委托代理的高校协作激励机制设计

Incentive Mechanism Design for University Cooperation Based on Multitask Principalagent Theory

摘要:

通过建立多任务委托代理模型,研究同时考虑提高科研和教学这两大任务的政府和强校之间的激励机制设计问题.通过对两个任务之间在独立、替代和互补三种关系下激励问题的研究,得到如下结论：当两任务的努力成本之间为互补关系时,通过对科研的激励可以同时提高教学水平;若两者为替代关系,则提高对科研的激励水平将促使高校只注重科研而忽视教学,弱化激励效率.通过弱化对教学和科研的激励差别,可以促使强校将精力在多项任务中进行合理分配.最后通过设计基于主观评价和监督的激励机制,将两者之间的替代关系转化为互补关系,从而解决激励效能弱化的问题.

Abstract:

The multitask principleagent models are presented to study the incentive mechanism between local government and universities.In this model,two main tasks of universities,namely,teaching and research are considered.Mechanisms under three kinds of relationships between the two tasks,namely,independent,substitutable and complementary,are discussed,respectively.The main conclusions are as follows.If the two tasks are complementary,incentives on research can improve teaching level.On the other hand,if the two tasks are substitutable,incentives on research will induce the university to ignore teaching and attach too much attention on research.As a result,the incentive performance will be weakened.To overcome this problem,subjective evaluation and supervision mechanisms are introduced to converting the substitutable relationship to a complementary one.In addition,it indicates that by redesigning incentive mechanisms,the incentive efficiency can be enhanced effectively.