在考虑信息完全共享且需求随机条件下，引入第三方物流服务提供商（third party logistics service provider,TPLSP）在物流运作中出现的货损货差因素，建立了由供应商、TPLSP和分销商组成的三级供应链独立决策模型和集中式决策模型.设计了收益共享契约，通过算例的仿真计算与分析，验证了实际情况中货损货差成本往往由TPLSP独自承担所造成的对TPLSP激励不足的问题.进一步证明了选择恰当的收益分配系数能够使供应链达到帕累托最优，同时也能激励TPLSP为减少货损货差付出努力；并给出了最优订货批量、TPLSP和供应商的协调定价以及收益分配系数的取值范围.
Cargo loss and damage in the logistics operation were introduced under the assumption of random demand and supply chain information being fully shared. An independent decision model and a centralized decision model were established with a supply chain of the supplier, the third party logistics service provider and the distributor. A revenue sharing contract was designed. Simulation and analysis results show the third party logistics service provider undertaking all the cargo loss and damage will result in the providers’ insufficient incentives. The Pareto optimization can be realized by selecting proper benefit allotting coefficients, and the third party logistics service provider is therefore encouraged to make efforts to reduce cargo loss and damage. Finally, the paper presents a proposal about the optimal order quantity, prices of the third party logistics service provider and supplier, range of benefit allotting coefficients.