政府补贴对闭环供应链成员利润分配的影响

Profits Distribution of Members in Closed loop Supply Chain with Government Replacement subsidy

摘要:

以家电以旧换新为研究背景，构建了无财政补贴和以旧换新补贴下闭环供应链成员利润分配模型，采用博弈技术求解出两种模型的闭环供应链成员利润分配情况.结果表明：采取以旧换新补贴策略前后，作为系统主导者的家电制造商往往有能力使自身收益分配最大化；作为跟随者的零售商和第三方回收商利润分配呈现此消彼长的关系.当制造商重心放在销售渠道时，零售商收益分配显著增长；当制造商偏重于回收渠道时，第三方回收商收益分配显著增长.

Abstract:

The government replacement subsidy promotes product upgrading and destroys the profits distribution pattern of closed loop supply chain. The members’ profits distribution models in the closed loop supply chain in the non subsidy policy and in the replacement policy are set up by the game theory based on game theory in the home appliances replacement background. The results show that the replacement subsidy can promote the product sales volume, waste product recovering volume and the members of closed loop supply chain profits and reduce the costs of waste products collection activities; the government subsidy coefficient can effectively adjust the members’ profits distribution in the closed loop supply chain; the average of the government subsidy, government subsidy coefficient, limits of government subsidy can affect the subsidy influence significantly.