基于声誉机制的服务外包道德风险控制

Controlling Moral Hazard in Service Outsourcing with Reputation Mechanism

摘要:

将合作时间纳入考虑，研究长期合作背景下服务外包中接包企业道德风险控制问题.发现了代理人声誉的演变机制，在此基础上揭示了声誉对代理人道德风险的隐性控制作用，并得到了生效的临界条件；进而提出了发包方的强声誉机制，分析了这一机制作为完全控制接包方道德风险的激励手段的可行性及其可行条件；最后对结论及其灵敏性进行了数值分析.

Abstract:

Taking cooperation time range into consideration, this paper investigates into the control of the moral hazard caused by the contractor in outsourcing in long term cooperation. The paper presents the evolution mechanism of the agent’s reputation, therefore, the reputation’s implicit effect on restraining the agent’s moral hazard is revealed, and the critical condition is discovered when the reputation became invalidated. A strong reputation mechanism for the principal is proposed, and an analysis is made of its feasibility and the corresponding conditions for a thorough elimination of the moral hazard. In the end, numerical analyses are made of the conclusion and its sensitivity.