工程项目承包商多层次利益分配与激励机制

Multi layer Profit Distribution and Stimulation Model Among Contractors in Construction Project

摘要:

针对工程项目业主、承包商、分包商所形成的多层次管理系统，通过参与方之间的利益分配函数，基于多阶段博弈理论构建工程项目多层次激励协调模型.假设所有承包商风险中性且愿意为获得更多利益而付出努力，以承包商和分包商的利润为约束条件，形成合作关系.结果表明：承包商的努力协调程度与协调成本有关，与其固定成本无关；利益分配系数大小不仅取决于承包商努力协调效率，还与其他参与者的努力协调效率有关；承包商在增强自身管理能力时，还要与其他参与方协调，避免其他参与方搭便车而降低项目管理总体绩效.

Abstract:

This paper develops a multi layer stimulation and collaboration model based on the multi phase game theory, where a client, contractors and subcontractors in a typical construction project form a multi echelon and multi party management system, and profits are shared among those participants by distribution functions. The assumptions are that all contractors in this model are risk neutral and they are willing to pay efforts in order to earn more profits, and the constraint conditions are the profits of general contractors and sub contractors, who will become cooperative partnership. It is revealed that contractors’ collaborative effort is related to collaborative cost, but irrelated to her fixed cost, and the profit distribution function depends not only on her collaborative efficiency but also on reciprocal collaborative efforts, which contributes to the improvement of the project management overall performance by avoiding the opportunistic participants.