研发人才区域性流动的进化博弈分析

Evolutionary Game Analysis on Regional Mobility of Research and Development Talents

摘要:

运用进化博弈理论，建立了流出地研发人才和流入地研发人才之间的非对称进化博弈模型.通过系统相位图分析，研究了在不同条件下进化博弈系统的进化稳定策略，从而揭示了研发人才空间集聚、更替、消散、凝滞的一般规律.由稳定性分析可知，当流出地和流入地初始环境相同时，研发人才区域性流动是个体的流动成本、流动收益及研发人才集聚外部效应共同作用的结果，政府可以通过调节流动成本、流动补贴、社会保障福利及控制知识溢出便利性等来选择人才流动的进化路径.

Abstract:

This paper builds an asymmetrical evolutionary game model of research and development talents between inflow region and outflow region. Through analyzing the phase diagrams, the evolutionary game system’s stability strategies under different conditions are studied. Consequently, the mechanism of the talents’ agglomeration, replacement, dissipation and stagnation is found. The results show that the talents’ decision on mobility is not only based on cost and income, but also based on intangible benefits from the external effect of talent agglomeration. Therefore, the government can choose the evolutionary path by adjusting talent mobility costs, talent subsidies, social benefits and by controlling the convenience of knowledge spillovers.