非对称成本扰动信息下双渠道供应链的契约设计

Contract Design with Asymmetric Production Cost Disruption Information in a Dual channel Supply Chain

摘要:

研究由单制造商和单零售商组成的双渠道供应链系统在非对称的生产成本扰动信息下的契约设计问题.使用委托代理理论，通过求解零售商优化问题的KuhnTucker条件，给出了非对称的生产成本扰动信息下的双渠道供应链的最优契约，并且分析了非对称成本扰动信息对于双渠道供应链定价决策、生产数量决策及供应链成员利润和整个系统性能的影响.研究表明，当生产成本扰动满足一定条件时，初始的生产计划仍然是最优的；制造商私有成本扰动信息不一定会给系统带来利润损失，并且明确给出了未造成利润损失的边界条件.

Abstract:

The contract design problem under asymmetric production cost disruption information in a dual channel supply chain composed of one manufacturer and one retailer is investigated. By utilizing the principal agent theory and solving the Kuhn Tucker conditions of the optimization problem, the optimal contract under asymmetric production cost disruption information are derived. Moreover, the impact of asymmetric production cost disruption information on the dual channel supply chain’s optimal pricing, the production quantity decision and supply chain members' profit and the whole system performance of the dual channel supply chain are analyzed. It is found that the original production plan is still optimal under some specific conditions, asymmetric production cost disruption information does not necessarily cause profit loss for the system. And the conditions under which the asymmetric production cost disruption information will not cause profit loss to the system are also explicitly presented.