政府和社会资本合作项目异化为地方政府明股实债融资的探讨

On Alienation of Public-Private Partnership into Real Debts of Local Governments

摘要:

将政府负债率纳入“均值?方差”风险评估模型中，在单期补偿契约策略下分析其对政府和社会资本合作（PPP）项目决策的影响。结果表明，社会资本方出于损失规避心理会要求更加确定的风险补偿和隐性担保，从而签订各种“明股实债”条款，使得PPP异化为地方政府违规举债的工具。基于2014―2016年间我国PPP项目及各城市负债率的数据，验证地方政府负债率过高是PPP项目异化的重要原因，而且民营企业参与的PPP项目更容易异化。因此，地方政府应根据自身财力合理上马PPP项目，同时强化PPP项目相关的法律建设和社会信用环境建设，保障社会资本方尤其是民营企业的合理权益。

Abstract:

This paper incorporates the government debt ratio into the “mean-variance” risk assessment model， analyzes its impact on the decision-making of public-private partnership （PPP） projects， and finds that investors will require more certain risk compensation and implicit risk compensation due to loss aversion， which makes the PPP project alienated as a tool of illegal debt-raising of local governments， i.e. “Formal equity， essential debt”. Furthermore， verifies the propositions of the theoretical model through an empirical analysis of PPP projects and urban debt information in China from 2014 to 2016. The findings suggest that local governments should initiate PPP projects according to their fiscal capability， and strengthen the legal construction and social credit environment construction related to PPP projects， to protect the reasonable rights and interests of social capital， especially private enterprises.