基于三方博弈的城市更新公私合作项目风险分担模型

Risk Sharing Model of Urban Renewal Public-Private Partnership Project Based on Tripartite Game

摘要:

从风险因素的不确定性出发，引入风险偏好，基于随机合作博弈理论和Shapley值法，计算出PPP（public-private partnership）模式下城市更新项目的随机Shapley值，从而构建城市更新PPP项目中政府部门、专业运营公司和投资公司三方参与的最优风险分担决策模型，并得出三方的最优风险分担比例。以上海某小镇PPP项目为例进行算例分析，计算得出政府、专业运营公司和投资公司三方的风险分担比例。分析表明，三方博弈的项目风险分担模型能很好地降低城市更新PPP项目的总风险和提高整体收益，有利于提高城市更新PPP项目的合作效率。

Abstract:

Starting from the uncertainty of risk factors， the risk preference is introduced. Based on the random cooperative game theory and the Shapley value method， the random Shapley value of PPP （public-private partnership） urban renewal project is calculated， in order to construct the optimal risk sharing decision model involving the government， the professional operating company， and the investment company in the PPP urban renewal project. In addition， the optimal risk sharing proportions of the three parties are obtained. Moreover， taking the PPP project of a town in Shanghai as a case example， the risk sharing proportions of the government， the professional operating company， and the investment firm are calculated. The result of the case analysis shows that the tripartite game project risk allocation model can well reduce the risk of the total urban renewal PPP project and increase the overall profit， which is conducive to improve the efficiency of urban renewal PPP project cooperation.