Analysis on Utility of Transportation Management Policy based on Game Theory

Abstract:

This paper investigated the utility of transportation management policy considering impact of management blind zone. Blind zone is a special phenomenon which is almost free from management measures. Travel by government-owned cars (GOC) is a kind of blind zone which was taken as a case study. Firstly, objective of government and travelers were analyzed. The governmental objective was formulated as maximum vitality of the urban center and mitigation of traffic congestion. Travelers’ objective was to maximize their travel utility. Then Stackelberg game theory was adopted to describe the equilibrium between government and travelers. With assumption of travel utility function, the output of the game model was solved graphically considering whether the urban center was developed or not. It is shown that for a developed center, the higher the proportion of travel by GOC, the lower the utility of traffic management policy. And the utility of the whole transportation system is decreased while GOC proportion increases.