The Equilibrium Strategies of Rent-Seeking Games of Developer based on Improved Tullock Model
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C 934

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    Abstract:

    This study focused on equilibrium strategy of developer land rent-seeking game. At first, the classical Tullock rent-seeking game model was improved and got the rent-seeking games model based on different expectation of land value. Subsequently, the analysis of game equilibrium was conducted under equalization assessment and discrepancy assessment of land value and realized effective equilibrium strategy of rent-seeking games participant. This model can be used for the result forecast of rent-seeking games, which is benefit for the economical and reasonable use of social resources. Eventually, a practical example was provided to illustrate the validity and feasibility of this model.

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LIU Tianhu, HUANG Wujun, XU Weisheng, WU Qidi. The Equilibrium Strategies of Rent-Seeking Games of Developer based on Improved Tullock Model[J].同济大学学报(自然科学版),2010,38(12):

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History
  • Received:August 28,2009
  • Revised:December 05,2009
  • Adopted:February 08,2010
  • Online: January 04,2011
  • Published:
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