Optimal Compensation Mechanism Design of Non point Source Pollution
CSTR:
Author:
Affiliation:

Clc Number:

F323.22

Fund Project:

  • Article
  • |
  • Figures
  • |
  • Metrics
  • |
  • Reference
  • |
  • Related
  • |
  • Cited by
  • |
  • Materials
  • |
  • Comments
    Abstract:

    A management model is first established under complete information, and then a contract is made to expose the farmers’ production type under incomplete information by incentive theory. An incentive model with government’s auditing is presented, which improves the compensation model. A discussion is held on the model’s result, as a result,the compensation mechanism of non point source pollution is obtained. The new mechanism can realize the management goal by farmers’ self declaration. At last, a numerical example validates the approach.

    Reference
    Related
    Cited by
Get Citation

武汉大学 系统工程研究所,湖北 武汉 ;江西省水文水资源与水环境重点实验室,江西 南昌 ,武汉大学 经济与管理学院, 湖北 武汉 ,南昌大学 管理科学与工程系, 江西 南昌 . Optimal Compensation Mechanism Design of Non point Source Pollution[J].同济大学学报(自然科学版),2012,40(1):0154~0158

Copy
Share
Article Metrics
  • Abstract:
  • PDF:
  • HTML:
  • Cited by:
History
  • Received:June 13,2010
  • Revised:November 15,2011
  • Adopted:September 05,2011
  • Online: February 06,2012
  • Published:
Article QR Code