Engineering Quality Supervision Management Based on Bounded Rationality

Abstract:

In the perspective of bounded rationality, this paper develops an evolutionary game model to analyze the evolutionary directions of groups’ behavior. Research findings indicate that there is a phenomenon of “invalidation of management” and the further analyses disclose that too high or too low penalty fee of quality competition is not good for the effective operation of the quality supervision system. By introducing the external incentive, we can change the evolutionary directions of the group strategy and find effective method to enhance quality management performance of the project. The study finds that for a certain contractor’s quality supervision incentive can bring the deterrent effect to other contractor’s quality behavior, to incentive the quality supervision of the contractor whose income is larger can enhance the performance of supervision. Finally, we use the deterrent effect to find the minimum cost of incentive strategy combination and achieve the system optimization of project quality management.

Key words:quality management;bounded rationality; evolutionary stable strategy; external incentive; group game