Cooperative Game Between Electric Vehicles Manufacturers and Government for Electric Vehicles Industry Development
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    Abstract:

    Regarding to the validity of financial subsidy policy about electric vehicles(EVs), game theory is adopted to establish the pricingdecision models of EV manufacturers under the conditions of with and without subsidy, respectively. The variable of consumers’ purchase decision behavior about EVs and conventional vehicles is introduced in the decision models so as to analyze the pricing decisions of EV manufacturers and the profit function in different situations. The results show that the optimal pricing about EVs by manufacturers under the financial subsidy is, however, higher than that without subsidy because of the information asymmetry. To improve the effectiveness of subsidy polices, some recommendations about canceling the GSP of subsidy, exploring the sharing mechanism, changing the actors of receiving subsidy and strengthening supervision are proposed.

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CHEN Yi, YOU Jianxin, XUE Yixi, KONG Deyang. Cooperative Game Between Electric Vehicles Manufacturers and Government for Electric Vehicles Industry Development[J].同济大学学报(自然科学版),2017,45(03):0440~0446

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History
  • Received:June 01,2016
  • Revised:January 03,2017
  • Adopted:December 05,2016
  • Online: April 01,2017
  • Published:
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