Influence of Retailer’s Fairness Concerns on Decision-Making of Dual Recycling Channel Closed-Loop Supply Chains

doi:10.11908/j.issn.0253-374x.21016

Home > Archive>Volume 49, Issue 10, 2021 >1494-1504. DOI:10.11908/j.issn.0253-374x.21016

Influence of Retailer’s Fairness Concerns on Decision-Making of Dual Recycling Channel Closed-Loop Supply Chains
DOI:
                        10.11908/j.issn.0253-374x.21016
                    
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Author:
                        ZHANG Tao1,2ZHANG Tao
School of Information Management and Engineering， Shanghai University of Finance and Economics， Shanghai 200433， China;Shanghai Key Laboratory of Financial Information Technology， Shanghai University of Finance and Economics， Shanghai 200433， China
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ZHANG Yuhao1ZHANG Yuhao
School of Information Management and Engineering， Shanghai University of Finance and Economics， Shanghai 200433， China
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Affiliation:1.School of Information Management and Engineering， Shanghai University of Finance and Economics， Shanghai 200433， China;2.Shanghai Key Laboratory of Financial Information Technology， Shanghai University of Finance and Economics， Shanghai 200433， China
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Abstract:

In this paper， the retailer’s fairness concern is taken into account in the dual recycling channel closed-loop supply chain， and three decision models considering retailer’s fairness concern are constructed， which are analyzed and solved by using the game theory. The influence of retailer’s fairness concern on the optimal strategy and performance of each channel member in different models is analyzed. A numerical simulation is conducted to verify the conclusions and for further discussion. The results reveal that the retailer’s fairness concern has a great effect on the optimal strategies for chain members， including optimal wholesale and retail prices of product， return rate of used items. Meanwhile， this behavior tendency can capture more excepted utilities for the retailer， but leads to the excepted utility reduction for the manufacturer and has different impacts on the expected utility of the third party. In addition， the influence of the retailer’s fairness concerns will exert different influences on the total expected utility of the three decision models.

Key words:closed-loop supply chain;dual recycling channel;fairness concern;Stackelberg game

Reference

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ZHANG Tao, ZHANG Yuhao. Influence of Retailer’s Fairness Concerns on Decision-Making of Dual Recycling Channel Closed-Loop Supply Chains[J].同济大学学报(自然科学版),2021,49(10):1494~1504

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Received:March 08,2021
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Online: October 18,2021
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