Risk Sharing Model of Urban Renewal Public-Private Partnership Project Based on Tripartite Game

Abstract:

Starting from the uncertainty of risk factors， the risk preference is introduced. Based on the random cooperative game theory and the Shapley value method， the random Shapley value of PPP （public-private partnership） urban renewal project is calculated， in order to construct the optimal risk sharing decision model involving the government， the professional operating company， and the investment company in the PPP urban renewal project. In addition， the optimal risk sharing proportions of the three parties are obtained. Moreover， taking the PPP project of a town in Shanghai as a case example， the risk sharing proportions of the government， the professional operating company， and the investment firm are calculated. The result of the case analysis shows that the tripartite game project risk allocation model can well reduce the risk of the total urban renewal PPP project and increase the overall profit， which is conducive to improve the efficiency of urban renewal PPP project cooperation.