Evolutionary Game of Doctor-patient Trust Considering Dual Information Asymmetry and Interaction Duality

Abstract:

Considering the duality of doctor-patient interactions from both sides， an evolutionary game model of the doctor-patient trust with the simultaneous existence of adverse selection and moral hazard under the dual information asymmetry was constructed. The effect of factors on the doctor-patient trust was analyzed through the evolutionary equilibrium solution and simulation. It is shown that， the expectation higher than actual ability does not always result in negative emotion， and the reasonably high expectation helps both sides evolve their trust strategy when the expectation is higher than the actual condition but does not exceed the critical value； when it comes to ensure the patient’s information benefit， even there is an information disadvantage compared to the doctor， both doctors and patients still prefer trust strategy； it is more critical to improve the communication ability of the doctor and reduce the moral risk of the patient for trust strategy selection. Finally， in the context of the 1·20 Beijing Chaoyang Hospital injury case， the effects of the discussed progression of doctor-patient communication， expectation， and moral hazard on the trust behavior of both doctors and patients were discussed， and the effectiveness of the model was verified.

Key words:doctor-patient trust;dual information asymmetry;interaction duality;evolutionary game