Abstract:Change orders are the main cause of over budget cost. A project delivery mode called IPD (Integrated Project Delivery) can eliminate change orders in foreign construction projects, because its internal incentive mechanism based on principles of IPD can prompt contractors participating in the design phase to assist designers in optimizing design actively. In previous study, an IPDbased qualitative incentive mechanism adapting the situation of construction projects in China was established to eliminate change orders. First, this paper summarized the qualitative incentive mechanism. Then, by analyzing the characteristics of change orders that would be eliminated by designers and contractors in China, established a quantitative incentive mechanism based on the qualitative one. Finally, it verified the effectiveness of the quantitative incentive mechanism with the financial data of actual projects.

Abstract:The multitask principleagent models are presented to study the incentive mechanism between local government and universities.In this model,two main tasks of universities,namely,teaching and research are considered.Mechanisms under three kinds of relationships between the two tasks,namely,independent,substitutable and complementary,are discussed,respectively.The main conclusions are as follows.If the two tasks are complementary,incentives on research can improve teaching level.On the other hand,if the two tasks are substitutable,incentives on research will induce the university to ignore teaching and attach too much attention on research.As a result,the incentive performance will be weakened.To overcome this problem,subjective evaluation and supervision mechanisms are introduced to converting the substitutable relationship to a complementary one.In addition,it indicates that by redesigning incentive mechanisms,the incentive efficiency can be enhanced effectively.